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Abstract 
Robots seemingly in possession of an experiential mind, as well as humans allegedly 
incapable thereof, have been reported to elicit feelings of eeriness in their perceivers. The 
current work re-examined this claim, asking participants to rate both robots and humans in 
various social situations regarding their mind capacities (e.g., emotional capability, 
intelligence), non-mind qualities (e.g., animacy, usefulness), and overall appeal (e.g., 
eeriness, likeability). It was found that feelings of eeriness towards both targets formed a 
distinct emotional response that was separable from simple dislike. Yet, unexpectedly, 
eeriness towards both targets intensified, the less they were seen as possessing a typical 
human mind. For robots, however, this association was less consistent. Moreover, 
eeriness towards robots, but not towards humans, was most strongly predicted by a lack of 
perceived usefulness. These results indicate that mind attributions affect people’s attitudes 
towards each other more strongly than their attitudes towards humanoid robots. 
 
Keywords: impression formation, person perception, robot companion, social robotics, 
Uncanny Valley  
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Now you feel it, now you don’t: How observing human-human interactions and human-
robot interactions can make you feel eerie 
In recent years, robotic agents have begun to provide domestic, educational, and 
medical support to humans in everyday settings (Breuer et al., 2012; Broadbent, Stafford, 
& MacDonald, 2009; Reiser, Jacobs, Arbeiter, Parlitz, & Dautenhahn, 2013; Robins, 
Dickerson, Stribling, & Dautenhahn, 2004). In light of these developments, understanding 
human responses towards so-called companion robots has become a pressing issue of 
investigation (Amirabdollahian et al., 2013; Dautenhahn, 2007; Hindriks, Neerincx, & Vink, 
2012; Mavridis et al., 2012; Nourbakhsh, 2013). Despite its contemporary relevance, 
scientific inquiry on the topic dates back over forty years ago. As early as in 1970, the 
Japanese scientist Masahiro Mori hypothesized that robots would elicit increasingly 
positive feelings, the higher their human likeness, until they reached a level of realism that 
would make perceivers uncomfortable. This discomfort would only disappear, Mori argued, 
once robots would fully resemble their human counterparts.   
Since Mori’s original hypothesis, many researchers have tried to understand the 
occurrence of discomfort towards robots. While some have studied the likeability of robots 
(e.g., Bartneck, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2009), others have focused on the experience 
of eeriness in their presence (e.g., Hanson, 2006). Eeriness towards robots has frequently 
been defined as a sense of strangeness and disquiet that is accompanied by feelings of 
fear, anxiety, and/or disgust (Cheetham, Suter, & Jäncke, 2011; Ho, MacDorman, & 
Pramono, 2008). As robots may occasionally be disliked without appearing eerie, however, 
some scientists have even begun to study both likeability and eeriness in concert 
(MacDorman & Entezari, 2015; Zlotowski, Sumioka, Nishio, Glas, Bartneck, & Ishiguro, 
2015). Importantly, the scientific attempt to understand these different aspects of 
discomfort towards robots is fueled by observations that both may reduce people’s 
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willingness to engage with or approve of them (Syrdal, Dautenhahn, Koay, & Walters, 
2009; Young, Hawkins, Sharlin, & Igarashi, 2009).  
Based on these concerns, engineers around the world have tried to reduce 
discomfort around robots by optimizing their human-like shape or way of movement (e.g., 
Piwek, McKay, & Pollick, 2014; Prakash & Rogers, 2015; Rosenthal-von der Pütten & 
Krämer, 2014; Thompson, Trafton, & McKnight, 2011; Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhaun, te 
Boekhorst, & Koay, 2008). Less work, in contrast, has examined the effects of robots’ 
psychological human likeness by manipulating their (alleged) mental abilities (e.g., 
Breazeal & Scassellati, 1999; Cangelosi, 2010; Dominey & Warneken, 2011; Ge & Han, 
2008; Kamide, Takubo, Ohara, Mae, & Arai, 2014; McShane, 2014; Sytsma & Machery, 
2010; Zlotowski, Bartneck, & Strasser, 2014). Yet, some of the latter studies suggest that 
discomfort arises and intensifies specifically when robots are perceived as possessing a 
humanoid mind (Gray & Wegner, 2012; Waytz & Norton, 2014).  
The current project further elucidates this fascinating finding, building upon the 
assumption (cf. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Robbins & Jack, 2006) that human minds 
are generally expected to have the capacity to feel (i.e., experience) and to think (i.e., 
agency). During social interactions, people frequently judge each other’s experiential and 
agentic capacities in order to understand the invisible motivations that may underlie visible 
human behavior (Jack & Robbins, 2012; Knobe & Prinz, 2008; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & 
Wegner, 2010). But even encounters with non-human entities, such as objects or robots, 
can elicit so-called mind attributions (Chammat, Foucher, Nadel, & Dubal, 2010; Epley, 
Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008a; Krach et al., 2008; Meltzoff, Brooks, Shon, & Rao, 
2010). The more a robot acts in a goal-directed manner, for instance, the more it may be 
seen as possessing a human-like mind, especially when perceivers long for a sense of 
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predictability and control (Fink, 2012; Vogeley & Bente, 2010; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & 
Wegner, 2010; Zlotowski, Proudfoot, Yogeeswaran, & Bartneck, 2015). 
But what evidence is there to suggest that attributing human-like minds to robots 
may result in discomfort towards them? The psychologists Gray and Wegner (2012) 
recently demonstrated that a humanoid robot compared to a mechanical-looking one was 
not only seen as more capable of emotions, but also as eerier. In addition, their work 
revealed that the same mechanical looking super-computer was perceived as eerier, when 
it was described as possessing an experiential rather than an agentic mind. Based on 
these findings, the authors concluded that feelings of eeriness towards robots do not only 
depend on whether a mind is perceived to be present, but also on the type of mind a robot 
seems to possess. These comprehensive claims deserve further empirical consideration.  
First and foremost, as acknowledged by the authors themselves, it is of pivotal 
importance to replicate the original findings with a broader array of robots which “provide 
nuanced differences in [mind] capacities” (p. 129). Second, the specificity of the proposed 
link deserves further investigation. Researchers interested in robot-related eeriness have 
traditionally asked perceivers to judge robots more broadly, for instance, regarding their 
human likeness, animacy, or usefulness (cf. Bartneck, Kulić, Croft, & Zoghbi, 2009; Ho & 
MacDorman, 2010; Lee, Lau, & Hong, 2011). Are these non-mind judgments less relevant 
for predicting feelings of eeriness than the newly proposed mind attributions? Third, do 
mind attributions exclusively impact feelings of eeriness or do they affect a robot’s general 
appeal, such that seemingly mind-possessing robots are also perceived as less likeable 
and unsafe (cf. Ho & MacDorman, 2010; Syrdal, Nomura, & Dautenhahn, 2013)? Fourth, 
do mind attributions trigger feelings of eeriness towards robots per se or does the effect 
dependent on whether perceivers find such attributions unbelievable based on their 
preconceived notions about robots (Bartneck, 2013; Gray & Wegner, 2012; Kaplan, 
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2004)? Finally, it remains to be explored to which degree the link between mind 
attributions and feelings of eeriness may also depend on characteristics of the perceiver. 
For instance, people highly familiar with robots may hold more positive views about 
seemingly agentic robots (e.g., robots that guide, direct, and motivate subordinates) than 
those less familiar with them (Ju & Takayama, 2011). To address these questions, we 
conducted two studies that examined the patterns of associations between perceived mind 
capacities, non-mind qualities, and target evaluations in response to sociable robots.  
 
Study 1 
Considering that present day robots are far from showing truly human-like social 
abilities, we adopted a ‘life as it could be’ approach to explore the cognitive principals that 
govern contemporary attitudes towards companion robots (cf. Harder,  Polani, & Nehaniv, 
2010; Walters et al., 2011). Thus, a series of images portraying dyadic interactions 
between humans and robots was created and presented in an online survey (see Figure 
1A). It was predicted that displaying the same type of robot but in a wide range of social 
scenarios and in numerous communicative postures would induce varying impressions 
regarding its mind capacities (Beck, Stevens, Bard, & Caǹamero, 2012; Cohen, Looije, & 
Neerincx, 2014; Erden, 2013; Le, Hanoune, & Pelachaud, 2011; Mitchell & Hamm, 1997; 
Sciutti et al., 2013; Shaw-Garlock, 2009; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005). By experimentally inducing fluctuating impressions of mind capacities across the 
different interactions, we aimed to address the following questions: Are feelings of 
eeriness and mind attributions linked in a nuanced manner (Q1)? Does the link occur for 
both attributions of experience and attributions of agency (Q2)? Are feelings of eeriness 
more closely associated with mind attributions than with non-mind judgments (Q3)? Do 
changes in attributions of mind and non-mind judgments specifically affect feelings of 
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eeriness or do they generalize to reports of likeability and perceived safety (Q4)? Is there 
an association between participants’ mind attributions, their non-mind judgments and the 
degree to which they find that a robot acts in an (un)believable manner (Q5)? Finally, do 
perceiver characteristics modulate the link between mind attributions and feelings of 
eeriness towards robots (Q6)?  
 
Method 
Participants 
155 valid survey replies were obtained. Participants were between 18 to 54 years 
of age (M = 29.7 years, SD = 8.39; 4 non-responders). The sample comprised 51.0% 
males and 47.7% females (2 non-responders). Participants were of a diverse national 
background (42 different nationalities, 5 non-responders) and had a high proficiency in 
English (1 non-responder; 12.9% native English speakers, 78.7% proficient non-native 
English speakers, 7.7% non-proficient non-native English speakers). They reported a 
range of educational qualifications (9.7% high-school graduates, 2.6% technical school 
graduates, 15.5% had attended some college, 23.9% were college graduates with 
bachelor degrees, 29.0% were college graduates with master degrees, 17.4% held a 
doctorate degree; 3 non-responders). All participants provided informed consent before 
survey completion and followed a study protocol approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) of New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via various internet forums (e.g., 
http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html; http://beta.in-mind.org/online-research; 
http://www.wexlist.net; http://www.dubizzle.com), Facebook groups (e.g., Psychological 
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Research on the Net), and email lists (such as departmental email lists). All 
announcements invited English speaking individuals of at least 18 years of age to 
participate in an online survey (via www.qualtrics.com) in exchange for a prize draw 
(€20.00). After reading about the study’s goal (i.e., to learn about people’s responses to 
human-robot interactions), participants could give their consent to participate by ticking a 
dedicated box. They were then asked to rate a set of forty human-robot interactions (HRI) 
in randomized order. They were also asked to consider each robot as a unique exemplar 
throughout the study by judging each interaction without being influenced by the preceding 
images.   
In order to elicit a wide range of mind attributions, images of forty different HRI 
were used. The interactions ranged from primarily instrumental exchanges (e.g., giving 
directions) to largely affective exchanges (e.g., giving a hug), with some interactions 
combining instrumental and affective aspects (e.g., donating money to a beggar) or lacking 
either (e.g., having a chat). Importantly, all interactions had previously been found to 
engage neural networks of person perception and impression formation in the human 
brain, confirming their ecological validity (cf. Wang & Quadflieg, 2015). For each 
interaction, participants rated a robot’s overall appeal by rating the degree to which each 
robot appeared likeable (=1) vs. not likeable (=7), reassuring vs. eerie, safe vs. unsafe, as 
well as believable vs. not believable (cf. Bartneck et al., 2009; Ho & MacDorman, 2010). In 
addition, participants provided two non-mind judgments by rating whether each robot 
appeared animate vs. inanimate and human-like vs. machine-like (cf. Bartneck et al., 
2009). Finally, participants provided two mind attributions by rating the degree to which 
each robot appeared intelligent vs. unintelligent (to assess agency) and able to have 
emotions vs. unable to have emotions (to assess experience; based on Bartneck et al., 
2009; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). All rating scales appeared in randomized order below 
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each image. Participants were only able to proceed to a new image once they had 
completed all scales. 
Upon completion of the rating task, participants were asked about their familiarity 
with robots, proficiency in English, demographics (i.e., sex, age, nationality, education), 
and their distraction during survey completion (in this order). Familiarity with robots was 
assessed on a 6-item scale asking participants to rate the extent to which each of the 
following statements applied to them (1 = not at all to 7 = very much): ‘I have technical 
knowledge about robots’, ‘I am familiar with robots as toys’, ‘I am familiar with robots at the 
workplace’, ‘I am familiar with robots at museums’, ‘I am familiar with robots in 
books/magazines/comics’, ‘I am familiar with robots in movies/TV series’. Proficiency in 
English was probed by asking ‘Is English your native/first language?’ with three possible 
responses: 1 = Yes, 2 = No, but I am a proficient English speaker, 3 = No, and I 
sometimes struggle to understand it. Education was assessed by asking participants to 
choose ‘their highest degree or highest level of schooling completed at this time [1= no 
formal qualifications, 2 = less than high school graduate, 3 = high school graduate, 4 = 
technical school, 5 = some college, 6 = college graduate (Bachelor), 7 = college graduate 
(Master), or 8 = doctorate]. Distraction was probed by asking how focused participants 
were during survey completion (1 = I was focused on the survey and did not get distracted, 
2 = I was focused on the survey but got occasionally distracted, 3 = I got repeatedly 
distracted, or 4 = I did not take the survey seriously. Please consider disregarding my 
data). 
 
Data Screening and Preprocessing  
The survey was visited 429 times. All data were reviewed according to the 
following criteria: Only participants of at least 18 years of age who rated the entire set of 
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forty interactions and who refrained from asking us to disregard their data by the end of the 
survey (n = 169) were considered for analyses. We also excluded participants (n = 14) 
who provided the exact same judgment on at least one dimension across the entire set of 
interactions (e.g., who rated the perceived intelligence of all targets as 1). The latter 
criterion ensured that a) our participants used all dimensions to differentiate among the 
presented interactions and b) that within-person associations between the different 
dimensions of judgments could be computed for all participants. Thus, a final sample of 
155 responses was obtained. In a next step, we computed each participant’s average 
familiarity-with-robots score. Before averaging the replies from the corresponding items, a 
missing values analysis was run. One participant failed to complete the familiarity-with-
robots scale and four participants skipped one of the relevant items. Missing values on 
single items were replaced with the respondents’ average score derived from their 
completed items. A reliability analysis for the familiarity scale demonstrated high internal 
consistency (α = .88). Descriptive statistics revealed a wide range in familiarity with robots 
in the current sample (M = 3.67, SD = 1.61, Min = 1.00, Max = 7.00; 1 non-respondent).  
 
Results 
We first aggregated all data across individuals and interactions (see Table 1, 
column 2). Keeping in mind that lower scores reflect enhanced mind attributions (i.e., 
emotional capability and intelligence scores), these averages revealed that the interactions 
induced reliable mind attributions (i.e., as they generally fell below the scales’ midpoints). 
We then aggregated all data across individuals only, computing the average rating for 
each interaction. This analysis showed that, as intended, mind attributions varied 
substantially across the different interactions (see Table 1, columns 3 and 4 for minimum 
and maximum values). Subsequently, patterns of associations between perceived mind 
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capacities, non-mind qualities, and ratings of appeal were analyzed through a series of 
multi-level regressions (level 1: number of interactions per perceiver, level 2: number of 
perceivers) to account for variance in ratings within and across individuals in a non-
aggregated manner (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
Before investigating the associations of interest, a series of no-predictor models 
was specified to partition the variance of each outcome variable (i.e., of eeriness, 
likeability, safety, and believability) for each interaction i in individual j (Yij) into its within-
unit and between-unit components (Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2014). The four 
corresponding models provided a mean score for each outcome variable across 
individuals and interactions (i.e., the fixed-effect value for the intercept ɣ00, as displayed in 
Table 1) and estimated the between-interaction variation in intercepts (u0j), the between-
individual variation in intercepts (v0j), and residual within-individual error variance (ɛij). It 
was found that for all four outcome variables significant variation emerged across 
interactions (Wald Z for eeriness: 4.28; likeability:  4.12; safety: 4.26; believability: 4.30; all 
ps < .001), across individuals (Wald Z for eeriness: 8.48; likeability: 8.41; safety: 8.50; 
believability: 8.42; all ps < .001), and within individuals (all Wald Zs = 54.80, all ps < .001), 
justifying the multi-level regression approach.  
In line with our main question of inquiry, we then specified a within-person predictor 
model with eeriness as the outcome variable and the grand-mean centered (cf. Enders & 
Tofighi, 2007) predictor variables emotional capability (W1) and intelligence (W2). The 
model estimated two random effects (the interaction intercept, the individual intercept) as 
well as three fixed effects (the overall intercept, W1, and W2), adopting a default 
covariance structure (variance components, VC). It was found that robots appeared less 
eerie (i.e., more reassuring), the more intelligent [ß = .19, SE = .01, t(6189.29) = 12.81, p < 
.001] and the more emotionally capable [ß = .07, SE = .01, t(6147.12) = 5.28, p < .001] 
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they seemed [with ɣ00 = 3.39, SE = .13, t(95.39) = 27.22, p < .001]. Including these two 
mind capacity predictors reduced the variance in eeriness across (Wald Z: 8.43; p < .001) 
as well as within individuals (Wald Z: 54.79; p < .001), resulting in enhanced model fit, 
such that Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) was reduced for the within-person predictor 
model (BIC1 = 21100.94) compared to the no predictor model (BIC0 = 21368.41). 
In a next step, we further included the traditionally used non-mind ratings as within-
person predictors. Thus, we specified a model with eeriness as the outcome variable and 
the grand-mean centered predictor variables emotional capability (W1), intelligence (W2), 
animacy (W3) and human-likeness (W4). This time, the model estimated two random 
effects (the interaction intercept, the individual intercept) as well as five fixed effects (the 
overall intercept, W1, W2, W3 and W4). In this combination, ratings of perceived 
intelligence, animacy, and general human likeness, but not ratings of emotional capability, 
predicted feelings of eeriness towards robots (see Table 2). Including the non-mind 
predictors enhanced model fit further (BIC2 = 21005.38), reducing the variance to be 
explained across (Wald Z: 8.41; p < .001) and within individuals (Wald Z: 54.78; p < .001). 
To compare the observed patterns of association across all outcome variables of 
interest, the latter model was also computed for ratings of safety, likeability, and 
believability (see Table 2). For safety, a similar pattern of associations as for eeriness was 
observed. For likeability, however, all four within-person predictors explained variance in 
the outcome variable. In other words, robots were considered more likeable, the more 
animated, human-like, intelligent, and the more emotionally capable they seemed. Finally, 
robots were considered more believable, the more animate and intelligent, but the less 
emotionally capable they seemed. All three within-person predictor models reduced the 
variance to be explained across individuals (Wald Z for safety: 8.45; likeability: 7.99; 
believability: 8.34; all ps < .001) and within individuals (Wald Z for safety: 54.78; likeability: 
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54.77; believability: 54.78; all ps < .001), showing enhanced data fit compared to their 
corresponding no predictor models (safety: BIC0 = 20794.51, BIC2 = 20476.93; likeability: 
BIC0 = 20605.31, BIC2 = 19034.19; believability: BIC0 = 22208.76, BIC2 = 22128.98). 
Finally, we conducted a set of regression analyses with eeriness as the outcome 
variable and additional between-person predictors. First, we included a person’s age (X1), 
requiring the model to estimate six random effects (the interaction intercept, the individual 
intercept, and the slopes of W1, W2, W3, and W4 varying across individuals) as well as 
ten fixed effects, including the cross-level interactions of interest (the overall intercept, W1, 
W2, W3, W4, X1, X1*W1, X1*W2, X1*W3, X1*W4). Neither a main effect of age, nor any 
interaction effects with this variable emerged. Similarly, no significant main or interaction 
effects emerged for participants’ level of education. However, a significant gender by 
animacy interaction was observed, signaling that the association between ratings of 
animacy and feelings of eeriness was significantly stronger in females than in males. 
Moreover, entering participants’ grand-mean centered familiarity with robots as an 
additional between-person predictor (X2) revealed a significant main effect (but no 
interaction effects), revealing that enhanced familiarity with robots was accompanied by 
reduced feelings of eeriness towards them. Similarly, entering participants’ grand-mean 
centered self-reported proficiency in English (X3) revealed a significant main effect (but no 
interaction effects), suggesting that enhanced proficiency was accompanied by higher 
ratings of eeriness. The parameter estimates of our final model, including the nine fixed 
effects of relevance (the overall intercept, W1, W2, W3, W4, X1, X2, X3, X1*W3) are 
displayed in Table 3. Inclusion of the relevant between-person predictors enhanced model 
fit further (BIC3 = 20031.18), again reducing the variance in eeriness across (Wald Z = 
7.83, p <. 001) as well as within individuals (Wald Z = 52.53, p < .001). 
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Discussion 
In our first study participants were asked to rate the same type of robot in various 
social scenarios regarding its mind capacities, non-mind qualities, and overall appeal. 
Associations between the obtained ratings were analyzed based on theoretically derived 
questions of interest. It was found that feelings of eeriness were linked to mind attributions 
in a nuanced manner (Q1). Specifically, robots appeared eerier, the less emotionally 
capable and the less intelligent they seemed. Thus, nuanced associations emerged for 
both types of mind attributions (Q2). When mind attributions were considered in concert 
with traditional non-mind judgments, however, attributions of emotional capability failed to 
make a unique contribution to predicting eeriness. Additionally, ratings of animacy 
performed equally well as ratings of intelligence at predicting feelings of eeriness (Q3). 
The same pattern of associations as for feelings of eeriness emerged for evaluations of (a 
robot’s lack of) safety. Evaluations of (dis)likeability, in contrast, behaved slightly 
differently, signaling that the feelings of eeriness did not simply capture broad negative 
affect (Q4). For instance, emotional capability remained a significant predictor of likeability, 
but not of safety or eeriness, beyond ratings of intelligence, animacy, and human likeness.  
The data further revealed systematic associations between mind attributions, non-
mind judgments and perceivers’ expectations (Q5). A robot’s behavior was considered 
more believable, the more animate and intelligent, but the less emotion-related it seemed. 
Phrased differently, increases in perceived emotional capability simultaneously enhanced 
a robot’s likeability, but reduced its believability. Finally, examining the impact of inter-
individual differences across perceivers (Q6) revealed that people reported more eeriness, 
the less familiar they were with robots. In addition, women’s compared to men’s feelings of 
eeriness were more affected by a robot’s apparent lack of animacy.  
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But are the obtained findings specific to robotic targets after all? Although feelings 
of eeriness are usually studied in the context of robots, initial evidence suggests that the 
experience can also be triggered by conspecifics (Krämer, von der Pütten, & Eimer, 2012; 
Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004). In particular, people who seem to have an atypical 
human mind have been found to elicit eeriness (Gray & Wegner, 2012). It has therefore 
been recommended to also explore eeriness in response to humans (Zlotowski, Proudfoot, 
et al., 2015). To address this concern, we repeated our study including human-human 
interactions (HHI).  
 
Study 2 
Study 2 investigated to which extent the observed associations between mind 
capacities, non-mind qualities, and target evaluations as observed for HRI would 
generalize to HHI. Additionally, in order to address common concerns with online data (cf. 
Evans & Mathur, 2005), study 2 was conducted in a laboratory setting. Adopting a lab-
based approach also allowed us to manipulate participants’ psychological state during task 
completion. Doing so seemed warranted considering that people’s inclination to attribute 
human minds towards non-human entities is known to differ considerably across situations 
(Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Hallgren, 2012). In particular, following an experience of 
powerlessness and/or uncertainty, people seem to engage more strongly in mind 
attributions towards non-human entities, including animals, objects, and gods (Barrett & 
Johnson, 2003; Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008b; Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 
2010; Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006). In other words, mind attributions towards non-human 
entities often serve as a cognitive tool that allows perceivers to establish a sense of control 
(Waytz, Gray et al., 2010). What remains uncertain is whether people’s momentary sense 
of powerlessness can also shape their reliance on mind attributions towards humanoid 
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robots. In consequence, study 2 examined how the associations between mind 
attributions, non-mind judgments, and target evaluations would be affected A) by target 
type (i.e., robot vs. person) and B) by perceivers’ temporary mental state (i.e., powerful vs. 
powerless). 
 
Participants 
109 students and teaching/research assistants (68 females, 18 – 37 years of age) 
from NYUAD participated in the study for course credit or cash (AED 150.00). Due to the 
university’s admissions standards, all participants were proficient English speakers. They 
were assigned in a pseudo-random manner to the two experimental conditions of interest 
[powerful (PF) vs. powerless (PL)]. Participants who provided the exact same judgment on 
at least one rating dimension across the entire set of interactions were again excluded (n = 
3). Thus, the final sample consisted of 106 participants, distributed across two 
experimental conditions comparable in age [PF: M = 20.1, SD = 2.67; PL: M = 20.5, SD = 
2.93; t(104) = 0.82, p = .42] and gender composition [PF: 36 females, 18 males; PL: 32 
females, 20 males; Χ2(1) = 0.30, p = .69]. All participants provided informed consent before 
study completion and followed a protocol approved by the IRB of NYUAD. 
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were asked to complete two unrelated 
tasks on the perception and evaluation of social interactions. The first task required 
participants to recall a memory of a social interaction, whereas the second task required 
them to judge a series of social interactions. The recall task was administered in paper-
and-pencil form and required participants to write about a time in which they felt powerful 
and/or powerless (cf. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Subsequently, participants 
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completed a manipulation check, rating the extent to which the situation they had just 
described made them feel like A) they were in control, B) they were in charge of others (1 
= not at all to 7 = very much). Afterwards, participants were asked to complete a rating 
task similar to that used in Study 1 but on a 15 inch MacBook Pro laptop. 
The rating task was again administered as an online survey. Participants were first 
prompted to indicate their current mood (1 = very unpleasant to 9 = very pleasant; three 
participants skipped this question), before receiving on-screen instructions to look at a 
series of social interactions that involved either a robot and a human or two humans (see 
Figure 1B). Participants were told further that for each interaction one agent would be 
marked with an asterisk (*) and that their task was to respond to each designated target 
without being influenced by any of their preceding judgments. To ensure that the 
laboratory study could be completed within a reasonable amount of time (i.e., < 60 min), 
we used a subset of twenty HRI from the original online survey and their matching HHI (for 
further details on stimulus creation see Wang & Quadflieg, 2015). Given our interest in the 
effects of nuanced mind attributions, we selected interactions that covered a wide range of 
mind attributions based on the ratings in the original online survey (i.e., images that elicited 
mind attributions ranging from low to high emotional capability and/or intelligence). The 
resulting forty interactions (i.e., 20 HRI, 20 HHI) were presented in randomized order.  
On each trial, ratings were again requested for eight dimensions of relevance. This 
time, however, a shared understanding of eeriness across participants was ensured by 
presenting a sign above the computer screen which informed participants that eeriness 
was defined as a ‘strange and slightly frightening feeling’. The sign also listed the words 
‘uncanny and weird’ as synonyms and gave an example of how the word could be used 
(i.e., ‘an eerie green glow in the sky’). Moreover, to enhance the clarity of our measures, 
the rating task in study 2 presented unipolar instead of bipolar rating scales, requiring 
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participants to rate the presence of a single attribute at a time (e.g., eeriness) on a scale 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). As before, participants were asked to rate each target’s 
overall appeal (i.e., eeriness, likeability, and believability). Only safety judgments were 
dropped from the original list of evaluations as they had closely resembled eeriness 
judgments in the original online survey. Additionally, participants rated again each target’s 
mind capacities (i.e., its emotional capability and intelligence). Yet, in addition to study 1, 
participants were also asked to judge each target’s apparent ability to be considerate. 
Acting considerately has received particular attention in the literature on robot etiquette 
(e.g., Koay et al., 2013; Walters et al., 2008) and has been declared an important marker 
of mind capacities that goes beyond the mere capability of having feelings (Gray et al., 
2007). Hence, we included this important facet of an agent’s alleged mind capacities. 
Finally, we replaced the two original non-mind judgments of animacy and human likeness 
with dynamism and usefulness. The latter two non-mind judgments have also traditionally 
featured in the field of social robotics (e.g., Lee et al., 2011; Waytz, Morewedge et al., 
2010), but promised to be better suited for capturing impressions of both robots and 
humans. Upon study completion, participants were thanked, payed, and debriefed.  
 
Results 
All essays were analyzed for word length, demonstrating that participants in both 
experimental conditions elaborated on their memories to a similar extent [PF: M = 209 
words, SD = 35; PL: M = 221 words, SD = 45; t(104) = 1.55, p = .12]. Analysis of the 
manipulation check questions additionally confirmed that participants in the PF condition 
felt more powerful in the situation they described (M = 4.89, SD = 1.49) than participants in 
the PL condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.72; t(104) = 8.05, p < .001). Moreover, participants’ 
overall mood when starting the interaction rating task was marginally more positive for PF 
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participants (M = 6.72, SD = 1.41) than PL participants (M = 6.21, SD = 1.45; t(103) = 
1.82, p = .07]. 
We then began our analysis of the interaction task by averaging the collected 
ratings based on rating dimension and target type (see Table 4, columns 2-5). In order to 
investigate whether variations in attributions of mind and non-mind judgments 
corresponded for HHI and HRI, we correlated the average ratings per interaction (i.e., by 
collapsing across individuals) for both types of targets (HHI, HRI), separately for each 
experimental condition (PF vs. PL, see Table 4, columns 6 and 7). It was found that 
increases in a robot’s alleged emotional capability or intelligence in the context of a certain 
HRI, was associated with increases in a human target’s emotional capability or intelligence 
in the context of the corresponding HHI, regardless of experimental condition. Such 
correspondence also occurred for judgments of consideration, as well as for non-mind 
judgments, and ratings of likeability. In other words, similar rankings for mind attributions 
and non-mind judgments were found across the selected interactions, regardless of target 
type. Yet, such a pattern was notably absent for ratings of eeriness and believability.   
In a next step, we again computed no-predictor models for the outcome variables 
of relevant, that is, eeriness (BIC0 = 16576.68), likeability (BIC0 = 14679.51), and 
believability (BIC0 = 18270.12). For all three variables, significant variation across 
interactions (Wald Z eeriness: 2.90; likeability: 3.01; believability: 2.76; p < .01), across 
individuals (Wald Z eeriness: 6.42; likeability: 6.72; believability: 5.90; p < .001), and within 
individuals (Wald Z eriness/likeability/believability: 45.36, p < .001) was observed. We then 
proceeded by specifying a model with the outcome variable eeriness and the between-
person predictor experimental condition (X1), as well as the within-person predictors target 
type (W1), emotional capability (W2), and intelligence (W3), and their relevant interactions. 
Including these predictors resulted in a model that estimated six random effects (the 
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND EERINESS                                                                                                         21 
interaction intercept, the individual intercept, the slopes of W2 and W3, their slope x target 
type interactions X1 x W2 and X1 x W3) as well as twelve fixed effects of interest (the 
overall intercept, X1, W1, W2, W3, X1 x W1, X1 x W2, X1 x W3, W1 x W2, W1 x W3, X1 x 
W1 x W2, X1 x W1 x W3, see Table 7).  
Compared to the no-predictor model, this model showed enhanced data fit (BIC1 = 
14437.06), reducing variance in eeriness across (Wald Z = 6.18; p < .001) as well as 
within individuals (Wald Z = 42.86, p < .001). Specifically (see Table 5), it revealed a main 
effect of target type, signaling that robots were generally rated eerier than humans. In 
addition, effects of emotional capability and intelligence emerged for HHI, indicating that 
humans were eerier, the less emotionally capable or the less intelligent they appeared. For 
robots, in contrast, the effect of emotional capability was absent, whereas the effect of 
intelligence was slightly more pronounced. Finally, the effect of intelligence on eeriness 
was also found to be affected by condition, such that for both types of targets the 
association was stronger in the powerful than the powerless condition.  
In a next step, we re-specified the model to include all predictor variables, that is, 
also judgments of consideration (W4), dynamism (W5), and usefulness (W6), as well as 
the relevant interaction terms (see Table 6 and Figure 2). Doing so further reduced the 
variance to be explained across (Wald Z: 6.02; p < .001) and within individuals (Wald Z: 
40.92; p < .001), resulting in even better model fit (BIC2 = 14116.02). The effect of 
emotional capability was now modulated by target type and marginally so by condition. 
Thus, humans felt eerier, the less emotionally capable they appeared. This effect was 
absent for robots. In addition, the observed difference in slopes for human and robot 
targets was slightly smaller in the powerful than the powerless condition. In contrast, with 
regard to intelligence, humans were found to be less eerie, the more intelligent they 
seemed. Although the effect was reduced for robots, the difference in slopes was not 
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significant. For attributions of consideration it was found that both humans and robots were 
found to be slightly eerier, the less considerate they appeared. Furthermore, for robots, but 
not for humans, increases in eeriness were linked to decreases in perceived usefulness. 
Finally, for judgments of dynamism no significant effects emerged. 
We also computed the latter, full predictor model with the outcome variables 
likeability and believability (see Figure 2). For likeability (see Table 7), we observed 
enhanced model fit compared to the no-predictor model (BIC2 = 11265.05), reducing 
variance across individuals (Wald Z = 5.04; p < .001) as well as within individuals (Wald Z 
= 41.42, p < .001). A main effect of target type signaled that robots were rated slightly 
more likeable than humans overall. Additionally, it was found that both robots and humans 
were rated more likable, the more considerate, emotionally capable, intelligent, dynamic, 
and useful they appeared. Among these predictors, the effects of consideration and 
emotional capability were qualified by a significant interaction with target type such that the 
effects of these two variables on likeability were stronger for humans than for robots.  
For the outcome variable believability (see Table 8), the full predictor model also 
reduced variance within (Wald Z = 40.79, p < .001) and across individuals (Wald Z = 5.88; 
p < .001) compared to the no-predictor model, resulting in better model fit (BIC2 = 
14091.49). A main effect of target type signaled that humans were generally more 
believable than robots. Additionally, an effect of emotional capability was modulated by 
target type. Thus, humans but not robots were considered more believable, the more 
emotionally capable they seemed. Vice versa, for usefulness it was found that robots, but 
not humans, were considered more believable, the more useful they appeared. Both 
humans and robots were generally more believable, the more considerate they appeared. 
For intelligence and dynamism, no significant findings emerged.  
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Discussion 
In study 2, perceivers rated a series of HRI and HHI after describing a memory of a 
situation in which they felt either powerful or powerless. Ratings and associations between 
perceived mind capacities, non-mind qualities, and target evaluations differed substantially 
based on target type and marginally so based on the memory retrieved. In short, 
perceivers experienced enhanced eeriness towards humans, the less considerate, 
emotionally capable, and intelligent they appeared (Q1, Q2). Yet, non-mind ratings failed 
to predict eeriness towards humans (Q3). In contrast, evaluations of likeability were 
predicted by both mind and non-mind ratings (Q4). Specifically, humans were considered 
more likeable, the more they were rated as capable of having emotions, intelligent, 
considerate, dynamic, and useful. Evaluations of believability, in turn, were linked solely to 
(some) mind attributions (Q5): Humans were rated more believable, the more capable of 
emotions and the more considerate they seemed. Finally, the full predictor model returned 
a marginally significant interaction between perceivers’ temporary feelings of power and 
their ratings of eeriness (but not their ratings of likability or believability). This interaction 
signaled that the link between attributions of emotional capability and feelings of eeriness 
was slightly enhanced following a powerless compared to a powerful prime (Q6).  
These findings differed notably from those observed for robotic targets. Perceivers 
experienced enhanced eeriness towards robots, the less intelligent and considerate they 
seemed, but such a link was absent for judgments of emotional capability (Q1, Q2). In 
addition, the strongest predictor of eeriness towards robots (but not humans) was a non-
mind attribute (Q3): Eeriness enhanced most strongly, the less useful robots appeared. 
Interestingly, associations with likeability were generally similar for both types of targets 
(Q4). Thus, just like humans, robots were seen as more likeable, the more capable of 
emotions, intelligent, considerate, dynamic, and useful they seemed. Nevertheless, 
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significant interaction effects signaled that the links between emotional capability and 
likeability as well as between consideration and likeability were somewhat stronger for 
humans than for robots. Furthermore, robots were rated more believable, the more 
considerate, but also the more useful they appeared (Q5). Finally, in response to robots, 
associations between mind attributions, non-mind judgments, and target evaluations were 
unaffected by feelings of powerlessness (Q6). In summary, these findings revealed that 
associations between mind capacities, non-mind qualities, and target evaluations differed 
substantially based on whether human or robotic targets were assessed.  
 
General Discussion 
According to prominent theories on mind perception, humans infer that other 
entities have an invisible mind similar to their own based on two major attributions (Gray et 
al., 2007): On the one hand, they evaluate the degree to which an entity has agency. On 
the other hand, they judge a target’s capacity for experience. Based on these two 
assessments even non-human targets, such as robots, are occasionally perceived as 
possessing human-like minds (Fink, 2012; Vogeley & Bente, 2010). Recent data suggest, 
however, that attributing human-like minds to robots may come at the price of feeling eerie 
towards them (Gray & Wegner, 2012). A similar affective cost may accompany encounters 
with conspecifics that lack a normal human mind (Zlotowski, Proudfoot et al., 2015). 
Fascinated by these two closely related claims, we conducted one online survey (Study 1) 
and one laboratory study (Study 2) in order to revisit them. Therefore, two groups of 
participants were asked to rate robots (Study 1) and humans (Study 2) in various social 
situations regarding their mind capacities, non-mind qualities, and overall appeal in various 
social scenarios.  
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First and foremost, it was found that embedding robotic and human targets in 
otherwise identical scenarios succeeded at inviting similar mind attributions for both types 
of targets. Thus, scenarios that resulted in higher attributions of agency and/or experience 
for robots, also resulted in higher attributions of agency and/or experience for humans. But 
what were the consequences of these mind attributions (Q1, Q2)? For human targets, it 
was found that increases in mind attributions were associated with decreases in eeriness, 
regardless of whether aspects of experience (e.g., emotional capability, consideration) or 
agency (e.g., intelligence) were probed. For robots, similar effects emerged but less 
consistently so. For instance, in Study 1, both attributions of intelligence and emotional 
capability predicted feelings of eeriness towards robots, but only as long as these 
variables were considered separately from non-mind predictors. Upon inclusion of the 
latter, the association between emotional capability and eeriness disappeared. In Study 2, 
this association was never observed, regardless whether non-mind predictors were 
considered or not (for similar null findings see Broadbent et al., 2013).  
Compared to Study 1, Study 2 used less stimuli per target type and required 
participants to report their judgments for both types of targets on the same scale. Thus, a 
drop in overall measurement sensitivity could account for the lack of replication. Yet, under 
the same conditions, the link between ratings of intelligence and feelings of eeriness 
towards robots was replicated. Thus, the data consistently support the conclusion that 
robots appear eerier, the less intelligent they seem. Most importantly, however, the data 
also consistently challenge the claim that attributions of experiential capacities (such as 
emotional capability) would increase, rather than decrease, feelings of eeriness towards 
robots (Gray & Wegner, 2012). The data further indicate that recently proposed mind 
attributions are not necessarily better predictors of eeriness towards robots than 
traditionally used non-mind judgments (Q3).  
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In study 1, ratings of intelligence and animacy were equally effective at predicting 
feelings of eeriness towards robots. In study 2, the main predictor of eeriness was a 
robot’s perceived usefulness. These findings emphasize the need for more careful 
theorizing concerning possible associations between mind attributions and non-mind 
judgments with feelings of eeriness towards robots. Future work should examine the 
degree of conceptual overlap between mind and non-mind predictors. The elimination of 
the association between emotional capability and feelings of eeriness upon including 
ratings of animacy and human likeness in study 1, for instance, signaled that these 
variables shared substantial variance. Similarly, the drop in associative strength between 
ratings of intelligence and feelings of eeriness upon including non-mind predictors in 
studies 1 and 2 signaled conceptual overlap between mind and non-mind predictors. It 
seems likely, for instance, that intelligent robots are also frequently considered useful. 
Given this relation, attributions of intelligence may appear more strongly related to feelings 
of eeriness towards robots than they actually are – an effect that can only become 
apparent upon considering both types of predictors in parallel (or experimentally controlling 
for one of them). Thus, the relative contribution of mind and non-mind judgments on 
attitudes towards robots deserves further theoretical and empirical consideration. 
Furthermore, looking at the effects of mind and non-mind predictor variables in 
concert suggests that it is the general assessment of a robot’s (in)ability to assist or serve 
a human interaction partner that most strongly predicts perceivers’ feelings of eeriness (cf. 
Dautenhahn, 2014; Dautenhahn et al., 2005). As revealed in study 2, eeriness towards 
robots decreased most strongly, the more useful a robot was perceived to be. However, a 
robot’s ability to assist may not only depend on its mind capacities and non-mind qualities 
per se, but also on the task for which assistance is sought (Goetz, Kiesler, & Powers, 
2003; Walters et al, 2013). Phrased differently, the effect of mind attributions and non-mind 
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judgments on eeriness towards robots may also depend on their purpose. Recent 
evidence suggests, for instance, that a robot allegedly capable of emotions is considered 
less eerie when expected to work as a social worker rather than a data analyst (Waytz & 
Norton, 2014). Taken together, these data indicate that eeriness towards robots may 
primarily arise when people perceive inconsistencies between the robots’ mind capacities, 
non-mind qualities, and its assigned role (Lee et al., 2011; Li, Rau, & Li, 2010; Joosse, 
Lohse, Perez, & Evers, 2013).  
Moreover, the data demonstrated that the two pivotal measures of discomfort 
towards robots (i.e., evaluations of likeability and eeriness) can return markedly different 
results (Q4). Across both studies, the patterns of associations between mind/non-mind 
ratings and feelings of eeriness did not align with the patterns of associations between 
mind/ non-mind ratings and likeability. This observation provides empirical support for 
Mori’s original distinction between shinwakan (i.e., likeability) and bukimi (i.e., eeriness). 
The differential patterns of associations further emphasize the need to use both measures 
in parallel in order to capture discomfort towards robots in a more comprehensive manner 
(MacDorman & Entezari, 2015; Zlotowski, Sumioka et al., 2015). Most importantly, by 
delineating different aspects of discomfort scientists may ultimately be able to predict 
which aspect(s) compromise(s) people’s willingness to engage with or accept robots (Ho & 
MacDorman, 2010; Patel & MacDorman, 2015). 
It must also be noted that the associative patterns observed for feelings of eeriness 
and evaluations of safety were highly similar in the current work (cf. Study 1). This 
observation suggests that both types of evaluations may be linked by a common affective 
core, supporting definitions of eeriness which emphasize feelings of fear and anxiety 
(Cheetham, Suter, & Jäncke, 2011). The exact relation between feelings of eeriness and 
safety concerns, however, deserves further investigation. For instance, it seems feasible 
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that mind attributions and non-mind judgments may trigger concerns about a robot’s 
potential to harm others (Gray & Wegner, 2009), which could in turn elicit feelings of 
eeriness. Alternatively, mind attributions and non-mind judgments may trigger feelings of 
eeriness, which in turn could elicit safety concerns. What seems certain to date is that 
safety concerns are of central importance when it comes to establishing satisfying HRI and 
deserve particular empirical attention considering that robots can “provide a level of 
potential danger seldom experienced with other domestic technologies in the past” (Young 
et al., 2009, p. 105).  
Interestingly, it has been argued that differences in eeriness (and safety concerns) 
towards robots and humans may ultimately arise from the different expectations that 
perceivers’ hold about these two types of targets (Gray & Wegner, 2012). Based on 
common media portrayals, for instance, both robots and humans are generally expected to 
act intelligently, but emotional experiences are primarily expected in humans (Bartneck, 
2013; Gray et al., 2007). Eeriness based on mind attributions may only arise if these mind 
attributions violate perceivers’ expectations. To address this assumption, we also asked 
participants to judge how believable they found each of the portrayed targets across the 
different social scenarios. Yet, the obtained data were inconclusive. For instance, people 
were rated systematically more eerie and also less believable, the less emotionally 
capable they seemed. They were also rated less eerie, the less intelligent they seemed, 
but this time ratings of intelligence and ratings of believability were unrelated. Similarly, for 
robots it was found (across both studies) that decreases in perceived intelligence were 
accompanied by increases in eeriness, as well as decreases in believability. But then 
again, such corresponding associative pattern were absent for attributions of emotional 
capability. Even more so, the link between ratings of emotional capability and ratings of 
believability was inconsistent across both studies. While Study 1 signaled that robots were 
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seen as less believable, the more they seemed emotionally capable, Study 2 was unable 
to replicate this link. While differences in samples, measurement sensitivity, and 
considered non-mind predictors are likely to account for the observed differences, future 
research is necessary to better understand the relation between perceivers’ preconceived 
notions about robots and their attitudes towards them.  
Finally, the current work explored the role of a range of perceiver variables in 
predicting mind-attribution based feelings of eeriness towards robots (e.g., age, sex, 
education, and familiarity with robots in study 1; temporary feelings of power in study 2). 
Study 1 revealed that increases in familiarity with robots were associated with decreases 
in eeriness towards them. Familiarity failed, however, to modulate the strength of 
association between mind attributions and eeriness for robotic targets. Study 2 suggested 
that the strength of associations between attributions of emotional capability and eeriness 
may be modulated by feelings of powerlessness, but only when other humans rather than 
robots were concerned. Thus, additional research is needed to understand the effect of 
perceiver variables on eeriness towards robots. For instance, though study 1 did not find 
an effect of perceivers’ age, it must be noted that neither the opinions of children and 
adolescents, nor of the elderly (> 55 years of age) were probed. Considering that these 
age groups may be particularly likely to interact with companion robots in the future (cf. 
Flandorfer, 2012; Tanaka, Cicourel, & Movellan, 2007), their responses towards different 
types of companion robots deserves particular scientific scrutiny.  
Before concluding, a final short-coming of the current work must be discussed. In 
line with previous HRI research (e.g., Beck et al., 2012; Chammat et al., 2010; Erden, 
2013; Lee et al., 2011; Prakash & Rogers, 2015; Rosenthal-van der Pütten & Krämer, 
2014), participants in both studies based their judgments on static images of robots and 
humans. This methodology enabled us to present a wide variety of carefully controlled 
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social interactions to a large group of perceivers, unrestricted by the question of whether 
such interactions could currently unfold in the real world. However, the same approach 
limits our ability to speculate on how well the obtained findings generalize to observations 
of real-world interactions. The lack of motion cues, for instance, may have systematically 
underestimated the impact of motion-sensitive judgments (e.g., ratings of animacy and/or 
dynamism) on feelings of eeriness. In a related manner, the lack of direct exposure to real-
world interactions may have resulted in subdued emotional responding in our participants. 
Future work should therefore examine perceiver responses to real-world social interactions 
which either strictly control for relevant motion cues (e.g., both human and robotic targets 
display the exact same movements) or systematically manipulate them (e.g., both types of 
targets display human and ‘robotic’ movements; cf. Cross et al., 2012). 
In summary, the current work adopted a novel methodological approach (i.e., the 
portrayal of social interactions) to investigate the link between mind attributions, non-mind 
judgments, and target evaluations for both robots and humans. It was found that feelings 
of eeriness towards conspecifics intensified, the less they were seen as possessing either 
experience or agency. For robots, similar associations, but of weaker strength emerged. In 
addition, for robots (but not for people!), feelings of eeriness increased, the less useful 
they appeared. Finally, feelings of eeriness towards both robots and humans were not 
simply reducible to experiences of dislike, but formed a distinct emotional response that 
was largely unaffected by characteristics of the perceiver.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Examples of interactions as presented in studies 1 and 2. (A): Human-Robot 
Interactions (HRI); (B): Human-Human Interactions (HHI). Images of humans were 
downloaded from www.shutterstock.com and are reproduced in this manuscript in 
adherence with the company’s standard license terms of service 
(http://www.shutterstock.com/licensing.mhtml).  
 
Figure 2. Regression slopes for evaluations of eeriness, likeability, and believability based 
on the between-person predictor experimental condition (powerful vs. powerless) and the 
within-person predictors target type (HHI vs. HRI), emotional capability, intelligence, 
consideration, dynamism, and usefulness.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Study 1: Mean ratings and standard deviations (in brackets) collapsed across 
individuals and interactions for each dimension of judgment, including minimum ratings 
(Min) and maximum ratings (Max) for the entire set of human-robot interactions collapsed 
across individuals only.  
Dimensions of Judgment Mean Min Max 
Animacy  2.87 (0.26) 2.30 3.46 
Believability  3.37 (0.68) 2.35 4.79 
Emotional Capability  3.61 (0.60) 2.48 4.52 
Human Likeness  3.05 (0.34) 2.34 3.68 
Intelligence  3.04 (0.37) 2.41 3.71 
Likeability  2.94 (0.38) 2.36 4.43 
Reassuringness (vs. Eeriness)  3.39 (0.58) 2.57 4.65 
Safety  3.04 (0.51) 2.43 4.39 
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Table 2. Study 1: Multi-level regression analyses for the different outcome variables as 
measured in response to forty human-robot interactions. 
 Parameter 
Estimates 
SE       df t-value p-value 
Reassuringness (vs. Eeriness) 
Intercept 3.39 .12 95.39 27.22 <.001 
Animacy 0.12 .02 6134.86 7.55 <.001 
Emotional Capability 0.00 .02 6183.12 0.15 .878 
Human Likeness 0.08 .02 6123.08 4.81 <.001 
Intelligence 0.13 .02 6128.43 8.34 <.001 
Safety 
Intercept 3.04 .12 110.30 26.02 <.001 
Animacy 0.11 .02 6128.88 6.89 <.001 
Emotional Capability 0.02 .01 6178.29 1.64 .102 
Human Likeness 0.07 .02 6116.55 4.67 <.001 
Intelligence 0.10 .01 6124.27 6.68 <.001 
Likeability 
Intercept 2.94 .08 79.18 36.20 <.001 
Animacy 0.19 .01 6165.72 13.36 <.001 
Emotional Capability 0.10 .01 6153.73 7.56 <.001 
Human Likeness 0.15 .01 6163.27 11.25 <.001 
Intelligence 0.18 .01 6186.11 13.41 <.001 
Believability  
Intercept 3.37 .13 87.67 25.01 <.001 
Animacy 0.11 .02 6143.35 6.14 <.001 
Emotional Capability -0.05 .02 6188.86 -2.87 .004 
Human Likeness 0.00 .02 6131.91 -0.09 .927 
Intelligence 0.09 .02 6136.73 5.41 <.001 
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Table 3. Study 1: Multi-level regression analysis for judgments of reassuringness (vs. 
eeriness) targeting human-robot interactions, including mind capacity attributions and non-
mind quality judgments as within-person predictors as well as perceivers’ proficiency in 
English, familiarity with robots, and gender as between-persons predictors.  
 Parameter 
Estimates 
SE       df t-value p-value 
Intercept 3.50 .14 151.36 25.77 <.001 
Animacy 0.08 .03 150.96 2.62 .010 
Emotional Capability 0.00 .02 156.39 0.04 .972 
Human Likeness 0.08 .03 140.93 3.31 .001 
Intelligence 0.10 .02 178.34 4.44 <.001 
English Proficiency -0.49 .16 147.08 -2.97 .003 
Familiarity With Robots -0.10 .05 146.71 -1.99 .048 
Gender* -0.13 .16 145.92 -0.77 .444 
Gender x Animacy* 0.16 .04 148.68 3.72 <.001 
*The reference group is male participants. Estimates are shown for female participants. 
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Table 4. Study 2: Mean ratings and standard deviations (in brackets) for human-human 
interactions (HHI) and human-robot interactions (HRI) collapsed across individuals and 
interactions according to experimental conditions, powerful (PF) or powerless (PL). The 
final two columns show correlations for interaction-based average ratings (i.e., collapsed 
across all participants) between both types of targets based on experimental condition. 
 HHI HRI HHI-HRI r(38) 
 PF PL PF PL PF PL 
Believability 6.34 
(0.82) 
6.29  
(0.59) 
3.45 
(1.22) 
3.30 
(1.30) 
.10 .08 
Consideration 5.35 
(0.73) 
5.47 
(0.69) 
4.45 
(1.21) 
4.37 
(1.26) 
.88* .87* 
Dynamism 4.87 
(0.88) 
4.96 
(0.92) 
4.23 
(1.14) 
4.41 
(1.21) 
.54* .70* 
Eeriness 1.46 
(0.43) 
1.43 
(0.43) 
3.24 
(1.38) 
3.28 
(1.39) 
.44 .28 
Emotional Capability 5.83 
(0.71) 
5.77 
(0.66) 
3.76 
(1.42) 
3.72 
(1.29) 
.69* .61* 
Likeability 5.20 
(0.74) 
5.27 
(0.79) 
4.52 
(1.13) 
4.67 
(1.08) 
.78* .86* 
Intelligence 4.78 
(0.78) 
4.73 
(0.86) 
4.38 
(1.11) 
4.34 
(1.27) 
.53* .74* 
Usefulness 5.26 
(0.69) 
5.34 
(0.72) 
5.04 
(0.76) 
5.18 
(0.91) 
.95* .97* 
*Correlation is significant at p < .05. 
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Table 5. Study 2: Multi-level regression analysis for judgments of eeriness including the 
between-persons predictor experimental condition (powerful vs. powerless) and the within-
person predictors target type (human-human interactions vs. human-robot interactions), 
emotional capability, and intelligence. 
 Parameter 
Estimates 
SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept 1.75 0.15 72.95 11.69 <.001 
Condition⁰ -0.03 0.16 133.96 0.21 .837 
Target Type* 1.48 0.08 3490.30 18.81 <.001 
Condition x Target Type⁰* -0.01 0.11 3423.84 0.09 .931 
Emotional Capability (EC) -0.29 0.05 154.54 5.96 <.001 
Intelligence (IN) -0.07 0.04 124.27 1.83 .069 
Condition x EC⁰ 0.08 0.07 179.73 1.13 .261 
Condition x IN⁰ -0.11 0.05 135.71 2.08 .039 
Target Type x EC* 0.29 0.06 132.94 4.45 <.001 
Target Type x IN* -0.15 0.06 113.93 2.30 .023 
Condition x Target Type x EC⁰* -0.14 0.09 150.85 1.48 .141 
Condition x Target Type x IN⁰* 0.09 0.09 126.21 1.03 .306 
⁰The reference group is powerful. Estimates are shown for powerless. 
*The reference group is HHI. Estimates are shown for HRI.  
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Table 6. Study 2: Multi-level regression analysis for judgments of eeriness including the 
between-persons predictor experimental condition (powerful vs. powerless) and the within-
person predictors target type (human-human interactions vs. human-robot interactions), 
emotional capability, intelligence, consideration, dynamism, and usefulness. 
 Parameter 
Estimates 
SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept 1.74 0.12 104.73 14.17 <.001 
Condition⁰ -0.06 0.15 129.91 0.43 .666 
Target Type* 1.54 0.08 3160.54 19.71 <.001 
Condition x Target Type⁰* -0.08 0.11 3259.80 0.70 .487 
Emotional Capability (EC) -0.22 0.05 194.47 4.82 <.001 
Intelligence (IN) -0.08 0.04 173.53 1.99 .048 
Consideration (CO) -0.10 0.04 238.49 2.44 .015 
Dynamism (DY) 0.00 0.04 105.99 0.04 .965 
Useful (US) 0.01 0.04 151.96 0.38 .704 
Condition x EC⁰ 0.11 0.07 223.28 1.65 .101 
Condition x IN⁰ -0.10 0.06 193.90 1.81 .072 
Condition x CO⁰ -0.02 0.05 190.45 0.44 .660 
Condition x DY⁰ -0.03 0.05 122.54 0.64 .521 
Condition x US⁰ 0.03 0.05 161.64 0.49 .625 
Target Type x EC* 0.24 0.06 176.17 3.75 <.001 
Target Type x IN* 0.03 0.06 156.81 0.57 .569 
Target Type x CO* 0.01 0.06 193.24 0.13 .899 
Target Type x DY* 0.00 0.07 141.72 0.03 .979 
Target Type x US* -0.34 0.05 172.17 6.51 <.001 
Condition x Target Type x EC⁰* -0.18 0.09 193.87 1.97 .051 
Condition x Target Type x IN⁰* 0.07 0.09 177.42 0.79 .430 
Condition x Target Type x CO⁰* 0.04 0.09 188.45 0.50 .615 
Condition x Target Type x DY⁰* -0.00 0.09 153.19 0.05 .964 
Condition x Target Type x US⁰* -0.02 0.07 187.98 0.32 .748 
⁰The reference group is powerful. Estimates are shown for powerless. 
*The reference group is HHI. Estimates are shown for HRI.  
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND EERINESS                                                                                                         50 
Table 7. Study 2: Multi-level regression analysis for judgments of likeability including the 
between-persons predictor experimental condition (powerful vs. powerless) and the within-
person predictors target type (human-human interactions vs. human-robot interactions), 
emotional capability, intelligence, consideration, dynamism, and usefulness. 
 Parameter 
Estimates 
SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept 4.73 0.08 56.54 59.61 <.001 
Condition⁰ -0.05 0.08 184.77 0.66 .506 
Target Type* 0.28 0.05 2469.65 5.14 <.001 
Condition x Target Type⁰* -0.01 0.08 2526.91 0.16 .875 
Emotional Capability (EC) 0.24 0.03 352.61 7.67 <.001 
Intelligence (IN) 0.08 0.03 210.93 2.71 .007 
Consideration (CO) 0.40 0.03 350.37 13.50 <.001 
Dynamism (DY) 0.15 0.03 207.18 5.28 <.001 
Useful (US) 0.13 0.03 240.27 4.56 <.001 
Condition x EC⁰ 0.01 0.05 396.19 0.16 .871 
Condition x IN⁰ 0.04 0.04 238.15 1.04 .302 
Condition x CO⁰ -0.02 0.04 282.59 0.40 .691 
Condition x DY⁰ 0.04 0.04 232.08 1.06 .292 
Condition x US⁰ -0.01 0.04 249.25 0.18 .855 
Target Type x EC* -0.10 0.04 286.83 2.68 .008 
Target Type x IN* 0.03 0.04 226.35 0.79 .431 
Target Type x CO* -0.12 0.04 239.00 3.22 .001 
Target Type x DY* -0.02 0.04 227.15 0.50 .621 
Target Type x US* 0.07 0.04 234.26 1.97 .051 
Condition x Target Type x EC⁰* 0.07 0.06 322.17 1.22 .224 
Condition x Target Type x IN⁰* -0.05 0.06 265.08 0.88 .380 
Condition x Target Type x CO⁰* 0.07 0.05 228.04 1.32 .189 
Condition x Target Type x DY⁰* -0.05 0.06 250.74 0.90 .370 
Condition x Target Type x US⁰* -0.06 0.05 257.42 1.15 .251 
⁰The reference group is powerful. Estimates are shown for powerless. 
*The reference group is HHI. Estimates are shown for HRI.  
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Table 8. Study 2: Multi-level regression analysis for judgments of believability including the 
between-persons predictor experimental condition (powerful vs. powerless) and the within-
person predictors target type (human-human interactions vs. human-robot interactions), 
emotional capability, intelligence, consideration, dynamism, and usefulness. 
 Parameter 
Estimates 
SE df t-value p-value 
Intercept 6.00 0.11 96.63 53.03 <.001 
Condition⁰ .09 0.13 146.82 0.72 .472 
Target Type* -2.74 0.08 3300.76 34.91 <.001 
Condition x Target Type⁰* 0.21 0.11 3399.46 1.90 .057 
Emotional Capability (EC) 0.21 0.04 202.70 4.74 <.001 
Intelligence (IN) 0.05 0.04 147.73 1.27 .206 
Consideration (CO) 0.08 0.04 3808.62 2.26 .024 
Dynamism (DY) -0.02 0.04 159.37 0.42 .673 
Useful (US) 0.01 0.04 211.73 0.15 .878 
Condition x EC⁰ -0.02 0.06 231.72 0.24 .815 
Condition x IN⁰ 0.03 0.05 168.41 0.59 .553 
Condition x CO⁰ -0.08 0.05 3784.34 1.65 .100 
Condition x DY⁰ 0.05 0.06 182.35 0.90 .367 
Condition x US⁰ 0.06 0.05 218.90 1.08 .281 
Target Type x EC* -0.26 0.07 167.33 4.02 <.001 
Target Type x IN* 0.00 0.06 172.99 0.05 .962 
Target Type x CO* 0.02 0.06 257.71 0.33 .740 
Target Type x DY* 0.13 0.07 120.96 1.85 .067 
Target Type x US* 0.33 0.06 169.60 6.02 <.001 
Condition x Target Type x EC⁰* 0.10 0.09 183.08 1.11 .271 
Condition x Target Type x IN⁰* -0.15 0.09 193.04 1.63 .105 
Condition x Target Type x CO⁰* 0.04 0.08 251.72 0.48 .634 
Condition x Target Type x DY⁰* -0.14 0.10 130.69 1.45 .148 
Condition x Target Type x US⁰* 0.00 0.08 183.33 0.03 .976 
⁰The reference group is powerful. Estimates are shown for powerless. 
*The reference group is HHI. Estimates are shown for HRI.  
